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Abstract
The development of the land markets for selected European Countries (B, DK, D-W, F, NL) and the effects of agricultural
policy reforms on land prices are analysed in “Part I – Land Markets at the Country Level” of this article. The variables
describing the agricultural land markets are land prices, prices for rental land and the share of rented land. Over a
longer period of about two decades, the prices for agricultural land have been decreasing in real terms in general
(exception NL) while rental prices have been more stable. A regression analysis shows increasing price effects on prices
for agricultural land and on rental prices due to the ha-premiums, which were introduced by the Common Agricultural
Policy(CAP)-Reforms in 1992.
In “Part II – Farm Level Strategies for Land Purchase” the economic effects of changing land ownership are analysed
using the data base of Part I. Recommendations for farmers are to find out if long term rental contracts are available to
avoid tying up capital. If land market prices are lower than a certain threshold, land can be bought considering the
financial liquidity of the enterprise. Selling land could be appropriate to avoid financial liquidity stress, but this should be
only temporary and restricted to a marginal amount of land stocks. If profitability of crop production is relatively low or
land prices are relative high and rental contracts terminated, an entrepreneur should seek to rent new land, if possible,
or find alternative investments which yield higher profits than crop production.
Introduction
The production factor land is essential for agricultural firms in crop production as well as in animal production. General
availability of agricultural land (according to supply and demand on the land markets) and the prices for rental area as
well as land purchase prices determine the profitability of enterprises and the development of  farm size with
repercussions on the structural change of the agricultural sector. The objective is to asses the development of land
markets, analysing the prices for rental land and agricultural land purchased and the distribution between use of owned
land and rental area. The main focus of “Part I - Land Markets at the Country Level” (Chapter 2) is the question if ha-
premiums, which  were introduced in the 1992-CAP-Reform of the EU, have influenced agricultural land prices. In “Part II
– Farm Level Strategies for Land Purchase” (Chapter 3) optimal strategies are developed for land management of typical
farms with the main focus  on situations when rental contracts are terminated.Part I – Land Markets  at the  Country Level
2 Development of land prices on the national level in five EU-Countries
Eurostat prices for agricultural land and prices for rented agricultural land for five EU countries (B, DK, D-W, F, NL) have
been used for this analysis
4. The deflated land purchase prices
5 in the selected five countries show a peak in the late
1970s and early 1980s (Fig. 1). After a period of stagnation or even decreasing land prices, the prices recovered in most
countries at the end of the 1990s. Over the whole period from 1975 to 1999 the deflated land prices showed a
decreasing trend in four countries (B, DK, D-W, F). Only in NL did they show an increasing tendency. The average land
prices per ha, in real terms, have been highest in NL (20,981  ), followed by D-W (19,660  ), B (15,201  ) and DK
(9,010  ). In F the price level was lowest with 4,782  .
Figure 1: Agricultural land prices (left) and prices for rented agricultural land  (right)
in real terms ( /ha), 1975 – 1999; Source: Eurostat; own ca lculations
The deflated rental prices follow a negative trend in B, DK and F, while rental prices increased in the long term in D-W
and NL. Average deflated rental prices per ha were highest in DK (319  ), followed by NL (265  ), D-W (229  ) and B
(181  ). In France the lowest prices were also observed for this variable, with 133  / ha on average for the period 1975
to 1999.
The  share of rented land
6 differs considerably among the selected countries. The highest average proportions, with more
than 50 %, were in Belgium (70 %) and France (55 %), while the Netherlands (37 %) and Denmark (18 %) have the
lowest values. A considerable increase in rental shares occurred in France (+17 % in 25 years) and Western-Germany
(+20 % in 25 years), while the values for Belgium and the Netherlands show a decrease. On average for the selected
five countries (not included D-E), the share of rented land increased from 41.8 % in 1975 to 47.3 % in 1997.
                                                   
4 Excluded have been countries which distinguish between irrigated land and corresponding non-irrigated land, countries with missing
data in the period 1975 to 1999 and Luxembourg,  the last due to relative high land prices which are influenced mostly by off-farm
factors.
5 GDP deflator (1995 = 100)
6 The proportion of cultivated own land is available every other year. By interpolation the corresponding  rental share is
calculated.The panel data of the five countries over 25 years (1975 to 1999) provides 125 observations. A VAR
7-like, two-equation
system was selected to specify the interactions between land price and rental price and to determine the exogenous
influence of policy changes due to reforms of the CAP and the structural change in agriculture (the latter should be
covered by the rental share and its change). Endogenous variables are the price for agricultural land and the price for
rented agricultural land, both deflated and in logs. As exogenous variables the rental share, the deflated price index for
agricultural products
8 and the ha-premium
9 were selected.
 10
In-sample simulations on Eurostat data base
The estimated model is tested in-sample to show the accuracy according to the actual data and to isolate the effects of
the ha-premiums on the dependent variables. The in-sample simulations (Fig. 2) start in 1975, 1980 and 1990, and
provides one, two, etc. step-ahead forecasts, using the actual values for the exogenous variables. It is obvious that the
model is not able to follow the actual development especially for the time series “land price” during periods of larger
fluctuations as observed between 1975 and 1985. For the other periods, and for the other endogenous variables over
the total observation time, a better forecast quality can be observed.
It is of interest to what extent the ha-premiums have been transferred to non-farming persons. Two simulations, one with
and one without ha-premiums, can show what difference could occur in the price levels for agricultural land and for
rented agricultural land (Fig. 2). Without ha-premiums, the land price in real terms could have decreased on average to
about 8,100  /ha (1998) to 7,500  /ha (1999), which would have been a dramatic change which has to be interpreted
with care. The change in rental prices would have reached dimensions of 48   to 58  /ha compared to the in-sample
simulation in 1998 to 1999 and rental prices would have been decreased by 28 % to 35 % in these two years. In other
words, the land owners, who lease agricultural land, got a share of about  15 % to 18 % (1998 to 1999) of the ha-
premiums. The absolute figures should be interpreted with care. Most importantly, there seems to be no doubt that some
part of the ha-premiums have been transferred to the non-farming sector.
                                                   
7 vector auto-regressive
8 Additionally, the deflated price index for agricultural products is used. This variable represents changes in income
support by market measures in the CAP, which mostly reflects the decreasing income potential from market revenues.
9 As a measure for the ha-premium the average premium for soft wheat in € per ha in the relevant country is taken.
10 Besides Eurostat an other data source which has been used in a broader analysis is the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN)
data. There are additional variables available as the “livestock density” and the  „farm income (without premiums)”,
which have been used for the analysis. The results of the whole analysis are published in detail in FUCHS (2002).The future development of land prices in the EU will be  determined by the CAP-Reforms. Recently
11 the EU-Commission
published the proposal for the Mid - term-review
12. Here a de-coupling of most of the subsidies from the actual
production is foreseen. The ha-premiums then will stay with the land – holder who used the land in the reference period
2000 to 2002. Because areas which are not  eligible for ha-premiums will be excluded from the benefits of further
subsidies (unless subsidy rights are transferred) it can be expected that prices for agricultural land will decline













































































Land price (observed average) Land price (in-sample simulation)
Land price (no ha-premium scenario) Rental price (observed average)
Rental price (in-sample simulation) Rental price (no ha-premium scenario)
                                                   
11 July 2002 and up-dated in January 2003
12 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (21.01.2003)Figure 2: In-sample simulations showing the development of prices for agricultural land
and rented area (both in real terms,  /ha) with and without ha-premiums from 1993
onwards; Source: Eurostat; own calculations
II – Farm Level Strategies for Land Purchase
3 Land availability on farm level with main focus on transformation countries
Agricultural enterprises compete for the production factor agricultural land. They acquire new production area by rental
contracts or purchase of land. The advantages or disadvantages of each option  are that rental contracts  ensure
financial liquidity, but the land may not be available for the farm in the future, whereas purchase adds land to the farm
property permanently, but places a heavy burden on financial liquidity.
In transformation countries the state often administrates huge land areas. In the transition period, which is marked by the
vanishing of most state farms and restructuring of the legal form of enterprises, the agricultural land also has to be
redistributed in a short time period. In order to resolve distribution problems rapidly while retaining a measure of long-
term flexibility, the agricultural land is initially distributed primarily on a rental basis. After a while, when the economic
situation and the agricultural structure have stabilised, the firms may want to ensure their existence and obtain land with
long rental contracts or even better by purchase. The new firms evaluate the land market and the competition for land
increases.
Basically the problematic choice between “purchase or rental” is not restricted to transition countries, so all farms face
“normal” structural changes and need answers about how to optimise their land area. . Economic guidelines to apply in
the competition for land will be analysed for typical farms. The (initially exogenous) variables in the farm model are
availability of land, share of net worth in percent of farming assets, land purchase prices, land price increase, prices for
rental land, share of rental land, share of terminating rental area per year and gross margin in crop production (Table
1).
1: Parameters and initial position for typical farms: best case – worst case
scenarios
Variable Initial conditions
 best case  median  worst caseAvailability of
agricultural land
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550 /ha 700 /ha
Assumptions for the initial situation: 1,000 ha agricultural land, interest rate for loans 7 %,
savings interest 1 %, 0.25 worker per 100 ha crop land, 1,000  /ha stock of fixed assets
(buildings and machinery), income tax: 30 % of profits, planning period two decades. * The values
of these three variables are linked.
In order to offer a choice of options, a series of best case to worse case scenarios are analysed for typical farms. The
calculations are done for a 1,000 ha farm model; for other farm sizes all determinants, variables and results could be
down- or up-scaled (for example to 100, 500, ... ha). The calculations are done  projecting the financial variables on a
yearly base using a worksheet (Excel) and optimising land purchase and land leasing using the solver routine in Excel.
The objective of all scenarios is to maximise net worth at the end of a planning horizon of two decades, considering therestrictions due to financial liquidity, which means that new loans have to be covered by a two-fold ratio of farming assets
as security on the debts. The endogenous variables of the model are the yearly purchase or  sale of agricultural land.
In principle the following analysis can be structured in three parts. First a free land market is assumed (Chapter 3.1)
followed by scenarios where rental and purchase opportunities are restricted (Chapter 3.2) and finally a discussion about
alternative investments other than in agricultural land (Chapter 3.3).
3.1 Scenarios for free access to buy land due to high supply on land markets – On-farm-level
results for strategies to acquire agricultural land
If an entrepreneur could choose between different options to acquire agricultural land,  he  should first  consider rental
area (long - term contract at a guaranteed rate ) and only then consider purchasing land. Here a first restriction is
introduced: The initial rental area can not be increased, the only way to further increase farm area would be to buy
land. The first example for an optimal land purchase strategy is for a farm with a relatively high debt load (low net worth
of 25 %) and relatively high land prices (7,000  /ha). Figure 3 shows that here it is recommended first to keep as much
rental land as possible under contract (or stay with the 800 ha rental land), second to reduce liabilities in the beginning
of the planning period by selling land and third to start land purchase at a very low level using financial liquidity surplus.































































0 5 10 15 20
Planning horizon in years
000 € Financial assets (under material
assets = debts)
Material assets
Figure 3: Optimal development of farm land, material and financial assets – initial
situation: 80 % rental land, no rental contracts terminate, share of net worth 25 %, gross margin in crop production
550  /ha and agricultural land prices 7,000  /ha.
To demonstrate a more realistic scenario it is further assumed that rental contracts are terminated to a  certain degree
(for example10 % p.a.) and that a farm can buy land on a free market. The objective of optimising the development of afarm is to maximise net worth at the end of the planning period (20 years) under the constraint of keeping the operation
financially liquid. The endogenous variables are the trading of owned land through purchase or sale.
10 Examples are illustrated in Figure 4. All examples start with 1,000 ha farm land and the  loss of rental area is  10 %
p.a. With low land values (3,500  /ha) all farms are able to buy more than they lose in rental area, but with land prices
over 7,000  /ha (and gross margins in crop production at 550  /ha) no farm could maintain farm size, even if there
are higher shares of net worth and an initial stock of owned land. If land prices are very high (25,000  /ha) and  the
share of net worth 25 % or 50 % then farms will lose not only rental area but they are also forced to sell owned land. In












































Owned land in ha Rental land in ha Net worth
60 % share of rental land,
land price 25,000 €/ha
100 % rental land,
land price 3,500 €/ha
80 % share of rental land,
land price 7,000 €/ha
Figure 4: Optimal development of farm land and net worth depending on the initial
situation of share of net worth, land price, share of rented land and assuming 10 % of
rental contracts terminate p.a., unrestricted purchase of land and gross margins in crop
production 550 /ha in the planning period of 20 years.The growth of all the other examples is at the  limit of their financial liquidity and is determined by their share of net
worth, the profitability of crop production (gross margins) and the prices for land. In a free market for land the
termination of rental land can be compensated as long as the land prices do not exceed certain levels. These thresholds
will be analysed in detail in the next Chapter (3.2).
3.2 Scenarios when land purchase is restricted to terminated rental contracts
Restrictions on the development of farms are due to constraints outside the farms, for example supply of land on land
markets and, inside the farm, e.g. financial liquidity, which in turn is driven by gross margins in crop production or the
share of net worth of the farming assets. Under the objective of maximising net worth and the assumption that the farm
area size (of a profitable farm) can only be kept constant when all land from terminated rental contracts  is purchased
(assuming the land would be bought otherwise by competitors), the maximum price of agricultural land is calculated for
a wide range of initial situations (Fig. 5). The constraints of financial liquidity, a minimum of opportunity cost for capital
(interest on debt or savings), have to be met as in all other calculations  in this article.
With an initial low share of net worth (25 % of farming assets) and gross margins in crop production of 550  /ha, the
maximum land price is about 3,279  /ha, if loss of rental land is about 10 % p.a. (Fig. 5, left side). Increasing
terminated rental contracts up to 50 % p.a. would decrease the threshold for the maximum land price to 1,163  /ha.
Here, within 4 years more than 90 % of the agricultural land can be purchased. Land purchase at a loss of 50 % of rental
area p.a., but at an initial stock of 200 ha owned land out of 1,000 ha farm size, could be managed, if land prices are
as low as 1,465  /ha (Fig. 5, right side).
Definitely higher land prices (for example 10,685  /ha) can be afforded to keep farm land size constant, if higher gross
margins in crop production are obtained (for example 700  /ha) and, the share of net worth of farming assets is higher
(for example 100 %) and, a minimum of owned land in the initial situation (for example 200 ha out of 1,000 ha farm
size) and loss of rental area is limited (for example 10 % p.a.). In the latter case, when part of the land purchase is









25% 50% 75% 100%
Share of net worth
€/ha 60 %  share of rental land, gross margin 700 €/ha
80 %  - " -, - " -  700 €/ha
60 %  - " -, - " -  550 €/ha
80 %  - " -, - " -  550 €/ha











25% 50% 75% 100%
Share of net worth
€/ha loss in rental land: 10 % p.a., gross margin 700 €/ha
- " - : 30 % p.a., - " -  700 €/ha
- " - : 10 % p.a., - " -  550 €/ha
- " - : 30 % p.a., - " -  550 €/ha
- " - : 50 % p.a., - " -  550 €/ha
Figure 5: Maximal prices for agricultural land to keep farm size
constant - under the assumption that all land from terminated rental contracts should be
purchased – depending on the initial situation of share of rental land, gross margin in crop
production, loss of rental area, share of net worth and,
left: loss in rental land: 10 % p.a.               right: 80 % rental land (200 ha owned
land)
The conclusions of this scenario are that high land prices as well as a high loss in rental area  or a low share of net worth
makes it difficult for farms to compete for land. Such initial situations  make it possible to keep farm area size constant
only if land prices stay below thresholds such as those calculated. Later on it will be discussed what optimal pattern of
land purchase farms should choose, if these land price thresholds are passed.
Effects of an increasing share of terminated rental contracts
An increasing  rate of terminated rental contracts is simulated by an annual constant rate of loss in rental land. A zero
rate keeps the initial distribution of agricultural land, but the net worth is increasing due to a profitable crop production.
The optimal development of farm land (rental land and owned land) depending on the percentage of terminated rental
contracts is derived under the objective to maximise net worth at the end of a planning period of two decades and
considering financial liquidity constraints, In an initial situation with no owned land (Fig. 6, left side) and net worth share
at the lower end of the range, (25 % of assets), net worth can be maximised if parts of the agricultural land of the farm
were purchased. In the case of a gross margin in crop production of 550 /ha and agricultural land prices of
3,500  /ha, net worth increases the most (from 250 T  up to 3,812 T  in two decades planning period), if 2.9 % of therental contracts terminate and all together 445 ha  were bought. Further increasing loss rates of rented land at first forces
the farm to buy a greater share of land (842 ha at a rate of 8.8 % loss in rented land p.a.), but later on the considered
constraints restrict farm development in land size and in net worth. At a loss of 30 % of rental land p.a. the agriculturally
cultivated area decreases from 1,000 ha rented land to 250 ha mostly owned land by the end of the planning period.
In the case of very high rates of terminated rental contracts, the farm may be forced to sell owned land. In the example
shown in Figure 6 (right side, initial size of 400 ha owned land),  this would be the case if the loss rate of rented land is

















































































































Figure 6: Optimal development of farm land (rented land and owned
land) and net worth depending on the percentage of terminated rental
contracts – initial situation: share of net worth 25 %, gross margin in crop production 550
/ha and agricu ltural land prices 3,500  /ha and,
left: 100 % rented land right: 60 % rented land (400 ha own land)
Optimal strategies to acquire agricultural land when access to land is restricted
Farms which are in danger of losing their rented land sooner or later should purchase agricultural land if they can
increase net worth and financial liquidity over time. The preconditions are reasonable land prices(for example
3,279  /ha, see Fig. 5), sufficient gross margins in crop production and low rates of reduction of rented land, as shownbefore. If there is sufficient financial liquidity to buy all land with terminated rental contracts and no competitive
alternative investment is available, the optimal pattern of land purchase is to buy all available land. Which strategy would
be optimal if not all of these condition are given will be discussed for typical situations. To demonstrate optimal purchase
patterns for agricultural land the land price is set from 3,279  /ha to 3,500  /ha in a first step. Higher land prices in
general limit the ability to purchase agricultural land. In this special case the ability to purchase agricultural land
decreases in the third planning year by 15 %, in the fourth by 28 % and approaches 100 % again in the 10
th year of
planning (Fig. 7). The owned land reaches only 795 ha in the planning year 20 and net worth of the farm will increase






























































0 5 10 15 20
Planning horizon in years
000 € Financial assets (under material
assets = debts)
Material assets
Figure 7: Development of farm land, material and financial assets – initial situation: 100 %
rental land, 10 % of rental contracts terminate p.a., share of net worth 25 %, gross margin in crop production 550  /ha
and agricultural land prices 3,500  /ha.
With even higher land purchase prices (7,000  /ha in Fig. 8) the profitability of crop production decreases and less land
will be bought, even if all other factors remain unchanged.  All in all only 152 hectares will be purchased during the
planning period of 20 years and net worth of the farm will increase from 250 T  to only 977 T  (Fig. 8, left side). The
major land purchase  lies in the final years of the planning horizon, but it must be noticed that the size of the farm
shrinks by about three-quarters.
Again more favourable initial conditions as an higher share of net worth (50 %), a minimum of already 20 % owned land
(200 hectare) and higher gross margins in crop production (700 /ha) in turn enables the farm to buy about 330














































































































Figure 8: Optimal development of farm land – initial situations:
100 % rental land, 10 % of rental contracts
terminate p.a., share of net worth 25 %, gross
margin in crop production 550  /ha and
agricultural land prices 7,000  /ha.
80 % rental land, 30 % of rental contracts
terminate p.a., share of net worth 50 %, gross
margin in crop production 700  /ha and
agricultural land prices 7,000  /ha.
The general conclusion of this analysis is, that under the premise of profitable crop production, the ability to buy land is
limited by financial restrictions in the beginning and later on by the limited opportunity to purchase land from the stock of
terminated rental contracts (in the case of very restricted land market supply).
3.3 Competitiveness of alternative investment besides land purchase
Buying agricultural land is not the only investment alternative for a farmer. On the contrary many on-farm (intensive
plant production such as gardening and horticulture or investment in animal production facilities) and off-farm
investments are available. Here the analysis  aims to calculate the “internal rate of interest” necessary for investments
other than agricultural land to be competitive with investment in agricultural land. Again the optimal decision  depends
on many variables. To see the tendencies, once more typical situations are discussed. In Table 2 the price for agricultural
land varies between 3,500   and 7,000  /ha, while the  share of the initial net worth is 25 %, 50 % and 75 %. Other
parameters are a share of 60 % of rental area, which declines at a rate of 10 % p.a. and a value of 550  /ha for gross
margin in crop production. All further calculations assume that the initial rental area of 400 ha declines (to 73 ha after
two decades), the owned area stays at 600 ha and surplus capital is invested  in other activities.At a low level of agricultural land prices crop production is relatively profitable and alternative investments have to offer
relative high rates of internal interest (for example 37 % for No. (1) in Tab. 2). The lower the net worth rate the more
scarce is capital and liquidity and the higher are the opportunity costs for capital. Higher rates of net worth lead to lower
minimum internal rates of interest for alternative investments (such as 8.1 % for No. (3) in Tab. 2). This results  from the
leverage of net worth and is supported by the assumption that spare capital earns only 1 % interest on a savings account.
Increasing prices for agricultural land also reduce the competitiveness of crop production on bought land which in turn
reduces the necessary internal rate of interest for alternative investment (such as 3.6 % for No. (4) in Tab. 2).
:  Necessary internal rate of interest of alternative investments other
than agricultural land depending on prices for agricultural land and











(1) 25 % 3,500 36,7%
(2) 50 % 3,500 11,0%
(3) 75 % 3,500 8,1%
(4) 75 % 7,000 3,6%
(5) 100 % 25,000 1,5%
Assumptions: Farm area 1000 ha with a share of 60 % rental area, the latter declines at a
rate of 10 % p.a., gross margin  550  /ha in crop production; other a ssumptions see Table
1.3.5 Conclusions
In situations such as in transition countries, where within a short period most land is leased through rental contracts,
which could then could be taken over by purchasing the land, recommendations for farmers are as follows: (1) First one
should find out if long term rental contracts are available to avoid tying up capital. One also should calculate the
maximum price for agricultural land to keep or bring the farm to an intended size, according to the individual initial
situation such as profitability of crop production, share of net worth, share of rental area and so on. (2) If land market
prices are lower than this threshold, land can be bought considering the financial liquidity of the enterprise. (3) Selling
land will be appropriate to avoid financial liquidity stress, but this should be only temporary and restricted to a marginal
amount of land stocks. (4) If profitability of crop production is relatively low or land prices are relatively high, an
entrepreneur should seek to rent land or to find alternative investments which yield higher profits than crop production.
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